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Abstract
Although they caused great controversy, the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies
broke no new ground. They invoked procedures that are commonly observed
in modern Chapter 11 reorganization cases. Government involvement did
not distort the bankruptcy process; it instead exposed the reality that
Chapter 11 offers secured creditors—especially those that supply financing
during the bankruptcy case—control over the fate of distressed firms.
Because the federal government supplied financing in the Chrysler and GM
cases, it possessed the creditor control normally exercised by private
lenders. The Treasury Department found itself with virtually the same,
unchecked power that the FDIC exercises with respect to failing banks. The
Chrysler and GM bankruptcies are cautionary tales about Chapter 11, not
about government intervention. It may be time to entertain longstanding
proposals for reforming the reorganization process.

Were the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies precedent-setting distortions of
long-standing bankruptcy principles, enabled by government intervention? Or
were they typical of modern Chapter 11 practice, notwithstanding some unusual
features occasioned by government involvement?
Several bankruptcy scholars1 take the first view, as of course did the dissident
secured lenders in the Chrysler bankruptcy.2 This view implicitly sees a
correspondence between the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies and a federal
agency receivership. There an agency such as the FDIC can seize a failing bank,
†

Harvey R. Miller Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. I received helpful
comments from fellow panel participants and audience members at the 2009 Lawrence
P. King and Charles Seligson Workshop on Bankruptcy and Business Reorganization.
1
Mark J. Roe & David A. Skeel, Jr., “Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy,” working
paper (July 31, 2009), available at <http://papers.ssrn.com>; Barry E. Adler,
Testimony before the Congressional Oversight Panel, Field Hearing on the Auto Industry
Financing Program, July 27, 2009, available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/
testimony-072709-adler.pdf; Lynn M. LoPucki, Testimony before the U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Commercial and
Administrative Law (May 21, 2009), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/
pdf/LoPucki090521.pdf.
2
In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated by Indiana State Police
Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, --- S.Ct. ----, 2009 WL 2844364 (Dec 14, 2009) (No. 09285) (“2d Circuit Opinion”); Todd Zywicki, “Opinion, Chrysler and the Rule of Law,”
Wall St. J. (May 13, 2009).
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transfer good assets and favored debts (to depositors) to a government-owned
“bridge bank,” and then distribute the remaining assets to creditors left behind
in the receivership estate.3 Likewise in Chrysler and GM, the federal government
used its power as prepetition and DIP lender to influence management, force a
sale of good assets and favored debts (to the UAW) to a government-owned
entity, and let the court distribute remaining assets to creditors left behind in the
bankruptcy estate. The Chrysler/GM cases differ from a federal agency
receivership, of course, because of the presence of a judge in those cases. The
federal agency receivership is subject to minimal (if any) court oversight.4 But the
standard of judicial review wasn’t much more searching in the Chrysler and GM
cases, according to critics. The bankruptcy process, therefore, allowed the federal
government to seize and control Chrysler and GM in much the same way that
federal agencies can seize and control commercial banks.
It may be correct that these bankruptcies, in practice, differ little from federal
agency receiverships. But it is incorrect, I believe, to claim that these bankruptcies
differ substantially from the norm in modern Chapter 11 practice.5 Features of
these cases are controversial not because they distort long-standing bankruptcy
principles, but rather because they push current practice to an uncomfortable
limit. This was made possible by government intervention during an economic
crisis. I doubt that these cases have much precedential value because comparable
intervention is unlikely going forward.
1. An unexceptional bankruptcy?
Let’s focus on Chrysler, the more controversial of the two bankruptcies.
When it entered Chapter 11, its liabilities included secured bank debt,6 a secured
government (TARP) loan,7 and unsecured claims of suppliers and current and
former employees.8 Equity was held by Cerberus and Daimler.9 When Chrysler
3

See generally Edward R. Morrison, Is the Bankruptcy Code an Adequate Mechanism for
Resolving the Distress of Systemically Important Institutions?, Temple L. Rev.
(forthcoming).
4
See, e.g., James Madison Ltd. by Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085 (DC Cir. 1996).
5
The same view is espoused in a contemporaneous working paper by Stephen
Lubben, No Big Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in Context, Am. Bankr. L. J. (forthcoming
2009).
6
First lien secured debt amounted to about $6.9 billion. Motion of Debtors and
Debtors in Possession, Pursuant to Sections 105, 363 and 365 of the Bankruptcy Code
and Bankruptcy Rules 2002, 6004 and 6006, for (I) an Order (A) Approving Bidding
Procedures and Bidder Protections for the Sale of Substantially all of the Debtors'
Assets …, In re Chrysler LLC, et al., Case No. 09-50002, at 7 (Bankr. SDNY May 3,
2009) (“Sale Motion”) [Docket No. 190].
7
Id., at 8.
8
About $5.3 billion was owed to trade creditors, id.; at least $4.5 billion was owed
to the VEBA, id., at 18; and around $9 billion was owed to underfunded pension plans,
Motion of Debtors and Debtors in Possession for Entry of an Order Authorizing
Chrysler LLC to Enter into a Settlement … at 7, In re Chrysler, LLC, et al., Case No. 0950002 (Bankr. SDNY May 19, 2009) [Docket No. 1114].
9
Affidavit of Ronald E. Kolka in Support of First day Pleadings, Kolka Affidavit, at
17, In re Chrysler, LLC, et al., Case No. 09-50002 (Bankr. SDNY April 30, 2009)
[Docket No. 23] (“Kolka Affidavit”).
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exited, the secured bank debt had been wiped away. Other liabilities, including
the unsecured claims of suppliers and current and former employees, remained
on the firm’s balance sheet.10 Equity was now held by Fiat, employees (through
the VEBA), and the U.S. and Canadian governments.11
This is a reorganization with a twist. Creditors with highest priority—secured
bank lenders—were cashed out, nonconsensually, at 29 cents on the dollar (they
were paid $2 billion).12 How can a reorganization cash out non-consenting senior
lenders at less than par while offering full repayment to junior creditors such as
suppliers and employees?
This was accomplished, critics say, through a § 363 sale that circumvented the
traditional safeguards of § 1129. On paper, the sale process was ordinary: it
auctioned Chrysler’s assets, fetched a $2 billion high bid, and then distributed the
proceeds to senior lenders pursuant to absolute priority.13 Junior creditors
received nothing from this process. Their payments came instead from the
purchaser (the “New Chrysler”), which decided that payments to these creditors
served its economic and social objectives.14
In reality, critics argue, the sale process was defective in three respects. First,
there was no meaningful valuation of the firm prior to sale approval. Without it,
we cannot be sure that senior lenders received at least what they would have
recovered in a liquidation. This “liquidation baseline” is guaranteed in a
traditional reorganization plan15 but wasn’t taken seriously in Chrysler’s § 363
sale. To be sure, the company’s expert witness put forth two valuations, the
second of which ranged from $0 to less than $1.2 billion,16 suggesting that the
senior lenders received more than what their claims were actually worth.
Though some senior lenders objected to the valuation, they neither rebutted it
nor offered evidence of their own.17 Maybe the objectors were constrained by
the court’s accelerated schedule. Maybe not. For many months, everyone was
aware that Chrysler was deeply distressed and likely to enter bankruptcy.18 And
more than 20 days passed between approval of the bidding procedures on May
10

2d Circuit Opinion, supra note 2, at 111-12; see also U.S. Treasury Department,
“Obama Administration Auto Restructuring Initiative: Chrysler-Fiat Alliance,” press
release available at www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg115.htm.
11
2d Circuit Opinion, supra note 2, at 111-12.
12
2d Circuit Opinion, supra note 2, at 117 n. 9.
13
Id.
14
Opinion Granting Debtors’ Motion Seeking Authority to Sell, Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
363, Substantially All of the Debtors’ Assets at 22-23, In re Chrysler LLC, et al., Case
No. 09-50002 (Bankr. SDNY May 31, 2009) (“Bankruptcy Court Opinion”); 2d Circuit
Opinion, supra note 2, at 118.
15
1129(a)(7).
16
Bankruptcy Sale Opinion at 18-19.
17
Id., at 18; 2d Circuit Opinion, supra note 2, at 118.
18
See, e.g., Indicative Summary of Terms for Secured Term Loan Facility (Dec. 19,
2008), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/
chrysler%20final%20term%20&%20appendix.pdf (outlining conditions for government
loans to Chrysler); Obama Administration: New Path to Viability for GM & Chrysler
(Mar. 30, 2009), http://www.treas.gov/initiatives/eesa/AIFP/fact-sheet.pdf
(imposing 30-day deadline to reach an agreement with Fiat).
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5, 2009, and the court’s hearings to approve the sale on May 27-29.19 Put
differently, although the Chrysler bankruptcy moved at a record pace, creditors
have faced comparable time pressure in ordinary Chapter 11 cases and still been
able to perform credible valuations. Prepackaged and prenegotiated cases, in
particular, move at rapid speed. During 2005, for example, the median case lasted
only 49 days; the median case lasted only 43 days in 2007.20
A second defect, according to critics, was the absence of adequate consent
from senior lenders. Had this case gone through traditional reorganization,
Chrysler would have needed consent from senior lenders holding two-thirds of
the value of claims in the same class. Such consent was missing in the § 363 sale.
Yes, it was approved by lenders holding about 70 percent of secured claims,21 but
these lenders were effectively wards of the state because they had recently
received federal TARP funds.22 The federal government was steering the § 363
sale (through its power as DIP lender), had a controlling interest in the likely
purchaser at the sale, and had indirect control over the only class of creditors that
could block the sale process. With the federal government on both sides of the
proposed sale, critics argue, TARP recipients had very different interests from
non-TARP recipients. In a traditional reorganization, the argument goes, the two
groups of secured lenders would have been separately classified and given
separate opportunities to vote on a plan. The bankruptcy court should have
demanded the same kind of consent in the § 363 sale and permitted the sale only
with approval from a super-majority of both TARP and non-TARP lenders.
The implicit assumption here is that § 1129’s requirements for plan
confirmation are applicable in § 363 sales as well. It is well-established that a § 363
sale cannot short circuit § 1129’s rules governing distribution of property of the
estate to creditors. The terms of the sale, for example, cannot dictate the
distribution of sale proceeds to particular creditors in violation of § 1129
priorities.23 It cannot lock-up the votes of creditors with respect to a forthcoming
plan of reorganization (a violation of §§ 1126 and 1129 voting rules).24 And it
cannot dictate the distribution of non-cash sale proceeds to different classes of
secured creditors while simultaneously terminating their replacement liens in the
proceeds (potentially a violation of § 1129’s absolute priority rule).25 This caselaw,
however, is concerned with § 363 sales that do more than just auction the firm’s
assets to the highest bidder. It deals with sales that make an end-run around §
1129 by specifying post-sale procedures or distributions.
19

Bankruptcy Sale Opinion, at 11-12.
These statistics are produced by Lynn LoPucki’s WebBRD database, available at
http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/bankruptcy_research.asp.
21
Kolka Affidavit at 5.
22
See, e.g., Brief for Appellants Indiana State Police Pension Trust, et al., at 12, Case
No. 09-2311 (2d Circuit June 4, 2009) (“The Treasury Department negotiated with the
First Lien Lenders led by the Administrative Agent, [JP Morgan], for a recovery of only
$2 billion. … JPM received tens of billions of dollars of TARP funds from the Treasury
and, therefore, was in no position to negotiate against the Treasury.”); “Statement from
Non-Tarp Lenders of Chrysler,” Wall St. J. (April 30, 2009).
23
In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 940 (1983).
24
Id.
25
In re Westpoint Stevens, Inc., 333 B.R. 30 (2005).
20

4

By contrast, § 1129 has little or no application to § 363 sales that are sales and
nothing more. If the sale is motivated by valid business concerns;26 if assets are
sold through a non-collusive27 auction process28 that yields a fair price29 ; and if
proceeds are subsequently distributed through the traditional reorganization
process, there are no § 1129 concerns. To be sure, at least one circuit court has
held that a bankruptcy court can apply § 1129 requirements to a § 363 sale if an
objector shows that it is being denied protections that it would enjoy in a
traditional reorganization.30 But the objector must show that the sale process
reduces the objector’s recovery or other tangible benefits relative to what it
would receive in a reorganization.31 It is not enough to show that different
procedures (such as classification and voting) applying in 363 sales than in
reorganizations.
Even putting aside § 1129’s application to § 363 sales, it is unclear whether the
divergent interests of TARP and non-TARP lenders would have required
separate classification in a traditional reorganization. It is not uncommon for a
creditor in one class to obtain a controlling voice in another class in order to
influence the bankruptcy process, usually via claims trading.32 Indeed, a DIP
lender frequently occupies multiple classes because it extended secured financing
26

In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983) (“The rule we adopt
requires that a judge determining a § 363(b) application expressly find from the evidence
presented before him at the hearing a good business reason to grant such an
application.”). See also In re Continental Air Lines, Inc., 780 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1986);
Stephens Indus., Inc. v. McClung, 789 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1986).
27
11 U.S.C. § 363(n) (“The trustee may avoid a sale under this section if the sale
price was controlled by an agreement among potential bidders at such sale, or may
recover from a party to such agreement any amount by which the value of the property
sold exceeds the price at which such sale was consummated….”
28
F.R. Bankr. Proc. 6004(f)(1) permits public or private auctions.
29
In re Wintz Companies, 219 F.3d 807 (8th Cir. 2000) (Stating that bankruptcy
courts have “ample latitude to strike a satisfactory balance between the relevant factors
of fairness, finality, integrity, and maximization of assets.”); In re Abbotts Dairies, 788
F.2d at 149; In re Willemain, 764 F.2d 1019, 1023 (4th Cir. 1985).
30
In re Continental Air Lines, Inc., 780 F.2d 1223, 1228 (5th Cir. 1986) (“[W]hen an
objector to a proposed transaction under 363(b) claims that it s being denied certain
protection because approval is sought pursuant to 363(b) instead of as part of a
reorganization plan, the objector must specify exactly what protection is being denied. If
the court concludes that there has in actuality been such a denial, it may then consider
fashioning appropriate protective measures modeled on those which would attend a
reorganization plan.”).
31
See, e.g., In re Torch Offshore, Inc., 327 B.R. 254 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2005) (denying
an objector’s complaint because it failed to show that it would enjoy greater benefits in a
reorganization); In re Condere Corp., 228 B.R. 615 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1998) (although
objectors pointed to lack of a disclosure statement and voting prior to 363 sale, court
denied objection because debtor a disclosure statement would be filed and voting would
occur after the sale).
32
See, generally, Paul M. Goldschmid, Note, More Phoenix than Vulture: The Case for
Distressed Investor Presence in the Bankruptcy Reorganization Process, 2005 Colum. Bus. L.
Rev. 191. Well-known examples include Figter, Ltd. v. Teachers Insurance & Annuity
Ass’n, 118 F.3d 635 (9th Cir. 1997); In re Westpoint Stevens, 333 B.R. 30 (SDNY 2005);
and In re FiberMark, Inc., No. 04-10463 (Bankr. D. Vt. Aug. 16, 2005).
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prior to the bankruptcy filing.33 It may have even purchased unsecured claims
before or after the filing. Through its position in multiple classes, the lender can
exert great leverage over the bankruptcy process. The federal government was
in much the same position in Chrysler. It was a DIP lender who had previously
extended prepetition loans; it exerted control over other classes through its
TARP lending. The only distinctive feature here is that the government used
TARP lending, rather than claims trading, to exert control over multiple classes.
Critics point to a third defect in Chrysler bankruptcy: the assets were sold
without a market test of their value because the bidding procedures discouraged
third party bidders from participating. Originally, the procedures permitted only
“qualified bids,” defined as those that would assume the same unsecured debts
(especially the VEBA) that the government’s bid would assume.34 Later the
procedures were amended to permit non-qualifying bids, but gave the federal
government and the UAW authority to review these bids prior to acceptance.
These auction procedures, critics show, distorted the process.35 They signaled to
potential bidders that the federal government had skewed the process and
would stifle competing bids. We therefore have no idea whether the $2 billion
winning bid approximates the fair market value of the assets.
The critics envision an auction procedure that hasn’t been tainted by the
parties in interest, but that kind of procedure is rarely seen in practice. It is
instead common for auction procedures to favor the stalking horse bidder,
which was precisely the role of the federal government in Chrysler’s
bankruptcy.36 That, of course, doesn’t rule out the possibility that Chrysler’s
33

See Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in
Chapter 11, J. Legal Analysis (forthcoming 2009) (analyzing large Chapter 11 filings
during 2001 and finding that two-thirds of DIP lenders were prepetition secured
lenders).
34
Motion of Debtors and Debtors in Possession … for (I) an Order (A) Approving
Bidding Procedures …, Exhibit A to Bidding Procedures Order at 4-6, In re Chrysler,
LLC, et al., Case No. 09-50002 (Bankr. SDNY May 3, 2009) [Docket No. 190].
35
Bankruptcy Sale Opinion at 38-39.
36
See, e.g., Corinne Ball & John K. Kane, “How to Handle Corporate Distress Sale
Transactions,” ALI-ABA Presentation (Oct. 23-24, 2008) (“A ‘qualified bid’ could
require a significant cash deposit, that the scope of the bid be substantially equivalent to
the scope of the stalking horse bid, a signed purchase agreement (including final
schedules, which may be very difficult to prepare), no financing or other non-regulatory
conditions, no break-up fees, and stiff overbid requirements.”); Ronald L. Leibow, et al.,
“Distressed Asset Sales: Selling and Acquiring Assets from the Debtor Estate,” PLI
Presentation (March-April 2005) (“Qualified Bid requirements typically require a
significant cash deposit, terms on substantially the same basis as the stalking horse bid,
a signed purchase agreement which is irrevocable until the assets are sold, and a
purchase price that exceeds the stalking horse bid by a specified amount (usually the
break-up fee and expense reimbursement combined).”); Harvey R. Miller, “Assets Sales
Pursuant to Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code,” PLI Presentation (Sept. 2003) (“A
qualified bid is a bid from a qualified bidder which meets certain qualifications,
typically including requirements that the bid: (a) provides for consideration greater than
the overbid and initial overbid amounts, (b) has substantially the same terms and
conditions as the stalking horse agreement; and (c) is accompanied by satisfactory
evidence of committed financing or other ability to perform.”).
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assets were sold at fire sale prices. Critics think this is likely based on two
features of New Chrysler’s capital structure: (1) its debt-asset ratio and (2) the
composition of its unsecured claims.
The bankruptcy auction pegged New Chrysler’s asset value at $2 billion. The
company, however, will owe the federal government $6 billion in secured debt
and about $17 billion to unsecured creditors. Even if the government debt is
forgiven, New Chrysler will never fulfill its promises to the VEBA and other
unsecured claimants unless its future asset value exceeds $17 billion. Either the
New Chrysler is destined to go bankrupt, or the assets are worth far more than
their valuation during the bankruptcy – and far more than the $2 billion they
actually fetched at auction.
There are at least three problems with this logic. First, it’s unclear what the
assets will be worth once Chrysler’s operations are rationalized and integrated
with Fiat’s. Second, the promises to the unsecured creditors may be credible
because the government—not New Chrysler—intends to honor them. It seems
clear that the government’s investment in Chrysler is meant to do much more
than save that company: it is meant to help stabilize an entire industry. Chrysler
is a conduit for achieving this policy goal. Third, and most importantly, the
critics’ hypothesis implies that the government’s $2 billion bid for Chrysler’s
assets was far, far below their fundamental value. Why, then, did we not see
competing bids? It seems unlikely that a financial institution, such as a foreign
hedge fund, would have looked askance at a massive arbitrage opportunity
merely because the bidding procedures favored the government’s bid.
Critics also point to the composition of the unsecured claims. New Chrysler
assumed the prepetition claims of Old Chrysler. How do we know whether
these prepetition claims are being assumed because New Chrysler needs to
maintain an ongoing relationship with the claimants (and promote labor peace)
or because it is favoring the claimants at the expense of senior lenders? We don’t
know. But the same question could be asked—and given the same uncertain
answer—in many § 363 sales. It is common for a purchaser to assume prepetition
liabilities. American Airlines assumed $3.5 billion of TWA’s debts, most of which
arose from aircraft leases.37 Hilco and Gordon Brothers assumed Sharper
Image’s prepetition liabilities arising from unexpired real estate leases and other
executory contracts.38 Wilbur Ross’s International Steel Group assumed the
environmental liabilities and certain obligations to salaried and hourly
employees of Bethlehem Steel.39 Were these obligations assumed for legitimate
business reasons, or did they divert value from senior creditors?
The foregoing observations suggest that the Chrysler bankruptcy was indeed
unexceptional. The bankruptcy is controversial not because it departed from
long-standing principles, but rather because government intervention pushed
37

American Airlines 10-K (Dec. 31, 2000).
Asset Purchase Agreement between Sharper Image Corporation and a Joint
Venture of Hilco Merchant Resources, LLC, Hilco Consumer Capital, LLC, Gordon
Brothers Retail Partners, LLC, and GB Brands, LLC (May 29, 2008).
39
Asset Purchase Agreement by and among International Steel Group Inc., ISG
Acquisition Inc., Bethlehem Steel Corporation, and the other sellers named herein (March
12, 2003).
38
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those principles to their limit, showing vividly the power wielded by the DIP
lender and the pliability of the modern Chapter 11 process.
2. Outer limits of Chapter 11: Bankruptcy as federal agency receivership
What is unique about the Chrysler bankruptcy is the role of the government
as prepetition and DIP lender during a credit crisis. Like any prepetition or DIP
lender, the government could impose exacting terms on Chrysler and thereby
dictate the course of its distress and bankruptcy. The credit crisis meant that the
government held a near-monopoly over the provision of credit, thereby
cementing its influence.
This influence transformed the Chrysler bankruptcy into a process
resembling a federal agency receivership. Through prepetition loans, the federal
government imposed strict deadlines for restructuring and sale of Chrysler’s
assets. It also obtained power to trigger Chrysler’s bankruptcy filing. These
powers resemble those possessed by federal agencies, such as the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), which supervise commercial banks and can impose a
receivership if a bank’s financial condition deteriorates.40
Once Chrysler’s bankruptcy was triggered, the government maintained
control over the manufacturer via the DIP loan. Loan covenants gave Treasury
powers commonly seen in modern Chapter 11 cases:41 Chrysler was ordered to
comply with a weekly budget of receipts and disbursements; it was forbidden to
change management or exceed limits on cash disbursements, indebtedness,
extensions of credit or other investments, and investments in financial
derivatives; and it was forbidden from exercising certain rights in bankruptcy,
such as seeking an extension of the exclusivity period.42 More importantly, loan
covenants required Chrysler to obtain approval of acceptable auction bidding
procedures within one week of the bankruptcy filing, to obtain approval of a 363
sale within 40 days of the filing, and achieve other “Case Milestones.”43 Also, a
default would occur under the DIP loan if secured lenders either (a) objected to
the price offered at the 363 sale or (b) made a credit bid at the auction. In the
event of default, Treasury had typical remedies: it could terminate the loan
commitment, demand immediate repayment, and compel Chrysler to sell assets
in order to repay the DIP loan.44 These remedies could be exercised without
court order. Put differently, no automatic stay would exist in the event of default.
The terms of the DIP loan allowed Treasury to dictate the course of the
bankruptcy process in much the same way that government agencies can dictate
the course of a bank receivership. A federal receiver has broad power to seize a
40

See generally Jonathan R. Macey, Geoffrey P. Miller, & Richard S. Carnell, BANKING
LAW AND REGULATION ch. 8 (2d ed. 2001).
41
For a survey of typical DIP loan covenants, see Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 33.
See also Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of
Corporate Governance, 154 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1209 (2006) and David Skeel, Creditor’s Ball:
The ‘New’ New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. Penn. L. Rev. 917 (2003) for
discussion of the control exerted through DIP financing loans.
42
51-58.
43
Id., at 59-60.
44
Id., at 62-63.

8

depository institution, change its management, and sell, liquidate, or reorganize
its operations.45 To be sure, Treasury could not unilaterally seize Chrysler in the
same way that the OCC or FDIC can seize a failing bank. Because depository
institutions are chartered by state or federal governments, they are subject to
government supervision and seizure in the event of insolvency. They can be
seized without prior notice or hearing.46 Although a court can review an
agency’s decision to appoint a conservator or receiver, the deferential standard
of review asks only whether statutory grounds existed for the appointment
based on the administrative record47 or, equivalently, whether the decision was
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.”48 Once a bank is placed into receivership or conservatorship, there is no
judicial oversight of subsequent decisions to sell assets, close the institution, or
merge it with another bank.49
Treasury, of course, would trip numerous constitutional limits—particularly
the Due Process and Takings Clauses—if it unilaterally seized control of Chrysler
before or after it entered bankruptcy. But these limits are easily navigated. A
simple solution is to offer aggrieved parties a right to sue under the Tucker Act
for compensation. That was the government’s approach when it intervened in
the railroad bankruptcies of the early 1970s, ordered them to continue
unprofitable operations until their assets were transferred to a new state-run
corporation (Conrail), and compensated creditors with securities in the new
Conrail corporation. The Supreme Court held that, if a taking occurred here, it
was not an unconstitutional taking because the aggrieved parties could bring suit
under the Tucker Act.50
But there is an even simpler way to navigate constitutional limits, as the
Treasury showed in Chrysler: the government can leverage the ordinary powers
of a pre- and post-petition lender to control the debtor’s operations as well as the
bankruptcy process. No due process or takings issues arise because the
government obtains control via contract.
45

See generally, Morrison, supra note 3.
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 191 (stating that the “Comptroller of the Currency may,
without prior notice or hearings, appoint a receiver for any national bank” if grounds for
appointment of a receiver exist), § 203(a) (giving OCC same power with respect to
appointment of a conservator).
47
See, e.g., Franklin Savings Ass’n v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 934 F.2d
1127 (10 th Cir. 1991) (interpreting the phrase “on the merits” in 12 U.S.C. 1464,
governing receiverships and conservatorships for savings associations, and explaining
that “[r]eview ‘upon the merits’ simply means the district court’s decision to either
dismiss the action or remove the conservator should be based upon the merits of the
action (i.e., whether statutory grounds for the appointment of a conservator exist),
rather than on procedural or policy oriented grounds.”). See also Woods v. Federal
Home Loan Bank Bd., 826 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1987) (same); Guaranty Savings & Loan
Ass’n v. FHLBB, 794 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1986) (same).
48
12 U.S.C. 203(b)(1). Courts have interpreted the phrase “on the merits” to imply
this standard of review. See, e.g., Woods, 826 F.2d at 1408-09.
49
Judicial review is available for the decision to impose a receivership, but not for its
conduct. See, e.g., James Madison Ltd. By Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085 (DC Cir.
1996).
50
Blanchette v. Connecticut General Insurance Corps., 419 U.S. 102 (1974).
46
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Moreover, the terms of the Treasury’s DIP loan—and the absence of
alternative sources of liquidity—meant that judicial oversight would matter little
to the course of the case. If Chrysler were not sold within the time and on the
terms set out in the covenants, Treasury could withdraw financing and force
immediate liquidation (and Fiat might walk away). That reality was clear to the
bankruptcy judge.51
These observations suggest that the Chrysler bankruptcy was radical because
it showed how standard Chapter 11 practices can, when harnessed to
government action, mimic procedures that are used to seize insolvent banks.52
The Chrysler bankruptcy did not distort existing precedent. It pushed precedent
to its limit.
3. The future of Chapter 11
The Chrysler and GM bankruptcies may typify modern Chapter 11, but
should we have a bankruptcy process that works this way? Modern Chapter 11
could offer the worst of both worlds. It is not merely a traditional reorganization
procedure in which debts are restructured or reduced and equity is redistributed
to existing creditors. That process has long been criticized as one that is
vulnerable to the biases of judges and to jockeying and holdup by creditors and
equityholders.53 Eastern Airlines has long been the poster-child for these
problems.54 Nor is the modern Chapter 11 merely a speedy auction in which
firms are routinely sold off. That process has likewise been the object of much
criticism because it can prematurely expose a firm to the market, generate firesale prices with correspondingly low returns to unsecured creditors, and yield a
(temporary) misallocation of resources.55 Modern Chapter 11 is instead a
51

See, e.g., Bankruptcy Sale Opinion at 17-18 (“… delay may vitiate several vital
agreements negotiated amongst the Debtors and Various constituents. Thus, approval of
the Debtors’ proposed sale of assets is necessary to preserve some portion of the going
concern value of the Chrysler business and to maximize the value of the Debtors’
estates. … The Governmental Entities, the funding sources for the Fiat Transaction, have
emphasized that the financing offered is contingent upon a sale closing quickly. … Thus,
the Debtors were confronted with either (a) a potential liquidation of their assets which
would result in closing of plants and layoffs, or (b) a government-backed purchase of
the sale of their assets … .”).
52
Bank receiverships differ from the bankruptcy process along another dimension:
when the FDIC intervenes, it is pursuing an explicit policy to minimize cost to the
deposit insurance fund. See generally FDIC, MANAGING THE CRISIS: THE FDIC AND RTC
EXPERIENCE Ch. 2 (1997). Although different policy goals animated the Chrysler
bankruptcy—the Treasury acted to minimize costs to auto industry workers and
suppliers—they yielded similar outcomes. The FDIC prioritizes the claims of depositors;
the Treasury prioritized the claims of workers and suppliers (relative to prepetition
secured debt).
53
See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. Legal
Stud. 127 (1986).
54
Lawrence A. Weiss & Karen H. Wruck, Information Problems, Conflicts of Interest,
and Asset Stripping, 48 J. Fin. Econ. 55 (1998).
55
See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity:
A Market Equilibrium Approach, 47 J. Fin. 1343 (1992); Todd C. Pulvino, Do Asset Fire
Sales Exist? An Empirical Investigation of Commercial Aircraft Transactions, 53 J. Fin. 939
(1998).
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combination of both. The outcome—a traditional reorganization or a speedy
auction—depends on the bargaining power of the various constituents. A
powerful DIP lender can push for a speedy sale, as it did in the Chrysler
bankruptcy, possibly at the expense of other creditors. Junior creditors can push
back and delay the bankruptcy process in hopes of at least a small recovery.56
Instead of a bankruptcy process that is vulnerable to creditor jockeying or
one that is vulnerable to fire sales, modern Chapter 11 is a process vulnerable to
both problems. Recent scholarship highlights this “worst of both worlds”
phenomenon. For example, one study shows that a Chapter 11 is more likely to
end in a sale when secured lenders are oversecured and therefore unconcerned
about the risk of a fire sale.57 Sales are significantly less likely when a firm has no
secured debt and when secured claims exceed the value of the firm’s assets.
Another study suggests that the recoveries of unsecured creditors are
substantially lower when a firm is sold off through § 363 than when it is
reorganized.58
To be sure, our system may not be as costly as it seems. Some studies have
found that the bankruptcy process is no more costly than comparable change-ofcontrol transactions,59 that the costs of this process are small compared the costs
of financial distress generally,60 and that firms in bankruptcy are no less efficient
in allocating productive resources than firms operating outside bankruptcy.61
Then again, it is difficult to disentangle the costs of our bankruptcy system from
the costs of financial distress generally, because the law affects the resolution of
distress in or out of court. And one recent study suggests that the expected cost
of financial distress may be as high as 4.5% of the pre-distress value of the firm’s
assets.62
If the inefficiencies in our modern Chapter 11 process are significant, it makes
sense to consider alternatives. Once it was common for scholars to propose
alternatives. The 1980s and 1990s saw proposal after proposal issued by Mark
Roe,63 Douglas Baird,64 Lucian Bebchuk, 65 Robert Rasmussen, and others.66 The

56

See Lawrence Weiss & Vedran Capkun, “Bankruptcy Resolution: Priority of Claims
with the Secured Creditor in Control,” working paper (2007) (available at
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1929&context=alea) (showing
that that absolute priority was violated in favor of unsecured creditors in 28% of cases
filed by publicly-traded corporations between 2002 and 2004).
57
Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 33.
58
Lynn M. LoPucki, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (2007).
59
Frank H. Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J. Fin. Econ. (1990).
60
Gregor Andrade & Steven N. Kaplan, How Costly is Financial (Not Economic)
Distress? Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions That Became Distressed, 53 J. Fin.
1443 (1998).
61
Vojislav Maksimovic & Gordon Phillips, Asset Efficiency and Reallocation Decisions of
Bankrupt Firms, 53 J. Fin. 1495 (1998).
62
Heitor Almeida & Tomas Philippon, The Risk-Adjusted Cost of Financial Distress, 62
J. Fin. 2557 (2007).
63
Mark Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83
Colum. L. Rev. 527 (1983)
64
Baird, supra, at note 53.
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proposals were attacked, and largely abandoned, at a time when some observers
felt that Chapter 11 actually worked pretty well. Times have changed. It may be
time to take the proposals seriously.

65

Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 Harv. L.
Rev. 775 (1988).
66
E.g., Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart, & John Moore, Improving Bankruptcy Procedure,
72 Wash. U. L. Q. 849 (1994).
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